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The behaviour of limit order quotes and trading activity are studied using a unique and 
rich database that includes the identity of market participants from a fully automated 
derivatives  market.  The  analysis  is  performed  using  transactions  records  for  three 
aggregated trader types and three trade identifiers, with trades stamped in milliseconds for 
the SXF, the equity futures contract of the Montreal Exchange. The identifiers distinguish 
trades between principals; agency based trades, as well as transactions that are conducted 
for risk management as opposed to speculative purposes. Agency related trades are shown 
to represent the largest amount of trading activity relative to other account types. Over 
90% of trades in this electronic market are limit orders. The limit order book, especially 
the depth 1 order, has a dominant role in providing liquidity and in explaining market 
participants’ trading behaviour. Participants in the SXF reference their trades to the best 
limit order depth. Hence, investors with large positions or investors who want to build a 
large  position  have  to  strategically  split  large  orders  to  close/build  their  position, 
according to the depth of the best limit order, to ameliorate price impact and information 
leakage effects. In addition, the results show that traditionally measured spreads have no 
relationship with trading costs. 
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Many exchanges in the world have shifted to the computerized trading systems for equities or 
derivatives. This shift has in part been driven by the belief that the computerized trading 
offers  lower  transaction  costs  than  traditional  floor-based  trading  systems.  One  of  the 
distinguishing features  of a  computerized trading market  vs.  a floor trading market  is  its 
transparent limit order book. Whether or not the increase in transparency of the computerized 
market comes at the expense of higher transactions costs and diminished liquidity has been a 
matter of considerable debate in the literature. The purpose of this study is to provide new 
evidence on this score using quotations and trades from an electronic market that operates via 
a  limit  order  book.  Our  database  is  particularly  rich  in  that  it  captures  differences  in 
transactions costs and trading activity between principals (vs. agents) as well as transactions 
that are conducted for risk management as opposed to speculative purposes. 
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A number of theoretical models have been proposed on how the limit order book affects 
liquidity and conveys information about the market. Such information might be expected to 
affect the trading conduct of market participants (e.g. Glosten, 1994; Handa and Schwartz, 
1996;  Foucault,  1999;  Handa  et  al.,  2003  and  Van  Achter,  2009).  Foucault  et  al.  (2005) 
propose an equilibrium model for order placement and argue that the proportion of patient 
traders in the population and the order arrival rate are the key determinants of the limit order 
book  dynamics.  In  addition,  a  number  of  empirical  studies  have  examined  the  order 
submissions process as market conditions change (e.g. Biais et al., 1995; Griffiths et al., 2000; 
Ahn et al., 2001 and Hollifield et al., 2003). Chan (2005) find orders at the best quotes react 
more quickly and completely to the adjustment than orders that are far away from the best 
quotes using the limit-order book and previous price movements for active stocks traded on 
the  Stock  Exchange  of  Hong  Kong.  Moreover,  several  other  studies  have  appeared  that 
examine the role of the limit-order books in supplementing liquidity. For example, Degryse et 
al. (2005) analyze the resiliency of a pure limit order market and find that relative to the 
sample average, depths stay around their mean before and after aggressive orders, whereas 
spreads return to their mean after about twenty best limit updates. The initial price impact of 
the aggressive order is partly reversed in the subsequent transactions. Coppejans et al. (2003) 
study the resiliency of the Swedish stock index futures market (OMX) and find that shocks to 
depth are restored in less than 60 minutes. 
 
On  the  whole,  the  role  of  information  contained  in  the  limit  order  book  in  influencing 
participants’ trading behaviour remains an unsettled matter in the literature. Madhavan et al. 
(2005) document a reduction in liquidity on the TSE following the increase in order book 
disclosure. They report an increase in quoted and effective spreads, reduction in depth at the 
best quotes and an increase in volatility. Bortoli et al. (2006) show that after the increase in 
pre-trade transparency limit of its limit order book, the SFE experienced a reduction in depth 
(mean and median), and some widening of bid-ask spreads. These studies suggest that in a 
transparent  market,  limit  order  traders  charge  market  order  traders  a  higher  premium  for 
execution  certainty  by  withdrawing  depth  from  the  best  quotes,  or  by  increasing  bid-ask 
spreads. In sharp contrast, Boehmer et al. (2005) document a reduction in effective spreads on 
the NYSE following the introduction of the Open Book, consistent with an increase in market 
liquidity. 
 
Our analysis is performed for one of the most important futures products on the Montreal 
Exchange, the S&P/TSX 60 index futures (SXF) contract. Since 2001, the Montreal Exchange 
has operated as a fully automated derivatives market and currently serves as the exclusive 
market  for  financial  derivative  products  in  Canada.  The  transaction  records  are  timed  by 
milliseconds and reflect actual trading activity that spans the period January 2005 to May 
2006. To the best of our knowledge, our work is the first attempt to use actual trading records 
for a comprehensive set of trader categories to study the limit order book in financial futures 
products.  
 
We find that that most transactions (well over 90%) in this electronic market are from limit 
orders. In addition, measures of trading activities and traditionally measured spreads have no 
relationship  with  trading  costs.  Limit  orders  in  the  electronic  system  of  the  Montreal 
Exchange serve to replace traditional market markers to provide market liquidity. The order 
information  shown  on  the  screen  systematically  influences  the  trading  behaviour  of 
participants in the markets. Participants in the markets respect the limit order book, especially 
the quotes of first priority order (best 1), to make their trading decisions. We find that SXF International Econometric Review (IER) 
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market in consistent with a dynamic equilibrium process: and the size of best 1 quote is much 
more than the size of transaction per trade in. In particular, the liquidity/buffer provided the 
best 1 quote is responsible for that measure of trading activities that have no demonstrative 
relationship with trading costs.  
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: in the Section 2, we describe the data set 





The Montreal Exchange is the exclusive exchange for trading financial derivative products in 
Canada. In 2001, the exchange became the first traditional exchange in North America to be 
fully automated. Clients’ orders are filled on a “first in, first out” (FIFO) basis. Market orders 
to  buy  futures  contracts  are  executed  at  the  offer  price  (ask);  market  orders  to  sell  are 
executed at the bid price (bid). However, an investor wishing to buy or sell at a specific price 
can provide a limit order. This order is registered in SAM’s (Montréal Automated System) 
electronic order book and is executed when there is a counterparty interested in transacting at 
that price. Orders are matched and both orders are filled at the specified price for the smallest 
quantity posted. Since all of the trading of any specific futures contract is concentrated on one 
trading platform, SAM, participants are assured of buying at the lowest offer price or selling 
to the highest bid. 
 
The Exchange  also  provides a system  of specialists  and market-makers.  The specialist is 
responsible for the opening of each product, and is required to be at his or her post no less 
than 30 minutes before the opening signal of a trading session. Market-makers are obligated 
to  maintain  50%  of  their  quarterly  activities  in  their  assigned  product.  Transactions  of 
specialists and market-makers in any security on which they have assumed responsibilities are 
required to be of a stabilizing nature. They are prohibited from making trades that may be 
disruptive  of  stability,  such  as  purchases  (sales)  made  at  a  price  above  (below)  the  last 
preceding different –priced trade while establishing or increasing a position. 
 
The S&P/TSE 60 index futures (SXF) contract is one of the most important futures products 
in the Montreal Exchange. The underlying product of the SXF is the S&P/TSE 60 index, an 
equity  portfolio  composed  of  60  highly  liquid  Canadian  equities.  Standard  &  Poor’s 
Corporation calculates and disseminates index prices. The SXF contract is quoted in index 
points, expressed to two decimals and the nominal value of one contract is C$200 times the 
index. The minimum price fluctuation of SXF is 0.05 index points. The value of 0.10 index 
point change is C$20 per contract. SXF contract months are March, June, September and 
December; and it is cash settlement and trades between 9:30 a.m. to 4:15 p.m. (EST).  
 
The data that we use in this study are considerably richer than those used in most previous 
studies that we are aware. The sample covers the 356 trading day period from January 2005 to 
May 2006. Our data  allow us  to  identify trades as  Limit, Market  or Market  on Opening 
transactions. Our data set provides real time quotes for bid and ask positions at various prices. 
The best bid price is defined as the highest price a prospective buyer is prepared to pay at a 
particular time for trading the futures contract. In the analyses, the variable Best 1 Bid is 
defined as  the best  bid  depth,  which corresponds  to  the sum  of all bid sizes  (number of 
contracts)  that  are  submitted  as  limit  orders  for  trading  at  the  best  bid  price  for  market 
participant bid quotations that are equal to the best bid price. Best 2 Bid is the second best bid Switzer and Fan-Limit Orders, Trading Activity, and Transactions Costs in Equity Futures in … 
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depth, and so forth. The best ask (or offer) price is the lowest price at which someone who 
owns the contract offers to sell it. We define Best 1 Ask as the best ask depth, which is the 
sum of all ask sizes (number of contracts) that are submitted as limit orders to trade at the best 
ask price for market participant ask quotations that are equal to the best ask price. Best 2 Ask 
is the second best ask depth. 
 
In addition we have two sets of identifiers for each transaction to distinguish between those 
that were buyer or seller initiated (buy or sell). First, each buy or sell is marked by four types 
of aggregated accounts: Client, Pro, Shareholder NonClient and Firm. Client accounts are 
defined  as  accounts  established  by  an  approved  participant  that  is  confined  to  Exchange 
transactions executed by and positions carried by the approved participant on behalf of his 
clients. Firm accounts are accounts established by an approved participant, that is confined 
to Exchange transactions executed by and positions carried by the approved participant on 
behalf of the approved participant. Pro accounts are accounts established by an approved 
participant, that is confined to Exchange transactions executed by and positions carried by the 
approved participant on behalf of a market maker. A Pro can be a market maker or a liquidity 
provider.  In  addition,  the  trading  records  also  identify  each  buy  or  sell  as  representing 
transactions of Hedgers, or Speculators, or Market Makers. Since Shareholder NonClient only 
has very few transactions in the records, we use the trading records on the Client, Pro, Firm 
account categories and transactions by Hedger, Speculator and Market Maker groupings in 
our analysis. 
 
Similar to Locke and Venkatesh (1997), the nearby SXF contract is selected each day, and it 
is rolled forward to the subsequent contract on the date when the maximum daily trading 
volume (Client account) switches from the nearby contract to the subsequent contract. 
 
3. EMPIRICAL ANALYSES 
 
3.1. Transaction Costs and Trading Activity 
 
Several  studies  have  appeared  that  explore  the  relationship  between  trading  activity  and 
transaction costs, and typically find that there are economies to scale in trading. Most of these 
studies use bid-ask spreads as measures of transactions costs. For example, Demsetz (1968) 
and  Epps  (1976)  find  that  trading  activity  is  inversely  related  to  trading  costs  on  NYSE 
stocks.  Martell  and  Wolf  (1987)  conclude  that  trading  volume  is  not  only  a  function  of 
volatility, but also of open interest, interest rates, exchange rates, and other variables. Haller 
and Stoll (1989) reported an inverse relationship between bid–ask spreads and trading volume 
in the German auction equity market. In addition, George and Longstaff (1993) document a 
negative relationship between transaction rates and bid–ask spreads for the S&P 100 index 
options market. Wang et al. (1994) state that the major factors affecting bid–ask spreads are 
price  risk,  trade  volume,  and  market  competition.  Wang  et  al.  (1997)  report  a  positive 
relationship between trading volume and intraday price volatility, and an inverse relationship 
between trading volume and bid–ask spreads, after controlling for other factors.  
 
Locke and Venkatesh (1997) show that bid-ask spreads are extremely problematic measures 
of transactions costs. For spreads to measure true transactions costs, it must be the case that 
customers trade exclusively with market makers. This assumption is clearly violated by many 
trading venues, particularly electronic platforms. In addition, as Stoll (1989) notes, even if all 
trades  are  mediated  through  market  makers,  the  quoted  bid-ask  spread  overstates  actual 
transaction costs if some customers are better informed than the market makers or market International Econometric Review (IER) 
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makers adjust the bid – ask spread prices to manage inventory levels. Real world factors also 
imply  that  bid-ask  spreads  are  not  the  best  measure  of  the  costs  of  trading,  since  inter-
customer trades do take place in most financial markets that may eliminate transaction costs 
in aggregate.  
 
To improve upon spreads as measures of transactions costs, a number of studies have used 
Computerized  Trade  Reconstruction  (CTR)  audit  trail  data  from  the  CME  and  employ 
accounting FIFO (First in, First out) trading profits to estimate the transaction costs (e.g. 
Chang et al., 1994; Fishman and Longstaff, 1992; Manaster and Mann, 1996; Chang and 
Locke, 1996; Locke and Venkatesh, 1997; Ferguson and Mann, 2001; Locke and Sarajoyi, 
2004 and Kurov, 2005). Accounting FIFO trading profit estimates provide a direct measure of 
transactions costs when transactions can be classified by trader identity. Similar to Locke and 
Venkatesh  (1997),  Ferguson  and  Mann  (2001),  Locke  and  Sarajoyi  (2004),  and  Kurov, 




In this study, we calculate three cost/profit estimates on each day. First, we use the accounting 
FIFO  rule  to  determine  trading  profits  per  contract  (PROFIT  TRADE)  and  obtain  the 
inventory positions for each of the six (trader) account types on the SXF. S econd, the profit 
settled per contract (PROFIT SETTLED) for the inventory positions of each account type is 
determined by assuming that the inventories in each aggregated account are settled at the 
closing price of each contract. Finally, we estimate average profits per contract for each type 
of account as the weighted average FIFO profits and settled profits of inventories with 
weights given by the number of contracts traded or settled. 
 
To illustrate the FIFO rule, suppose that there are only four transac tions during a day from 
investors in a Client account. At time t1, investors in the Client account buy 50 contracts of 
SXFH with a price of 500.0; at time t2, investors in the Client account sell 20 contracts of 
SXFH with a price of 500.2; at time t3, inve stors in the Client account buy 30 contracts of 
SXFH with price equal to 500.3; at time t4, investors in the Client account sell 58 contracts of 
SXFH at the price of 500.5. Suppose also that the average last bid and ask for SXFH at the 
end of the day is 500.8.  
 
First, we use the accounting rule of FIFO to get profit trade per contract (the value of 0.10 
index point change is C$20 per contract): 
C$20 *(20*(500.2-500.0) +30*(500.5-500.0) +28*(500.5-500.3))/78= C$6.3077 per contract;  
the inventory position in the Client account on SXFH is long 2 contracts at the end of that 
day. 
 
Second, the profit settled per contract for the inventory position is:  
C$20 *2*(500.8-500.3)/2 =C$10.0000 per contract. 
 
Finally, average profits per contract for the Client account on that day are: 
(C$6.3077*78+ C$10.000*2)/80=C$6.4000 per contract. 
   
                                                 
1 This procedure is alluded to in Stoll (1989), and also implemented by Beebower and Priest (1980) and Baesel 




Account  Dependent (C$)      Independent Variable         
Panel A: Ask    C  Q  TV  Std Q  Std TV  Std P  D  PValue  DW 
  Average  Coef.  -108.36  -6.5817  34.446  1.0964  -1.7344  22.501  44.448  0.1544  2.0290 
Client  profit  Prob.   0.0147  0.1661  0.0739  0.2522  0.2127  0.0492  0.3661     
  Profit  Coef.  -180.09  -1.7260  54.328  -0.1812  -2.1517  28.877  -12.279  0.0182  2.1070 
  trade  Prob.   0.0000  0.7103  0.0041  0.8466  0.1145  0.0101  0.7986     
  Average  Coef.  118.46  10.430  -43.779  -1.6332  8.0110  -41.331  -229.30  0.2223  1.9660 
Firm  profit  Prob.   0.1439  0.2289  0.1292  0.3632  0.2295  0.0539  0.5167     
  Profit  Coef.  262.79  2.6967  -70.060  -0.5724  9.8841  -53.598  -189.73  0.0112  2.0240 
  trade  Prob.   0.0005  0.7376  0.0092  0.7316  0.1110  0.0073  0.5637     
  Average  Coef.  -8.8075  0.8319  12.349  -0.3283  0.7803  0.0900    0.7531  1.9390 
Pro  profit  Prob.   0.7873  0.6309  0.6275  0.3297  0.9419  0.9811       
  Profit  Coef.  28.610  0.5111  -11.752  -0.2506  6.1457  -0.7388    0.9035  2.0190 
  trade  Prob.   0.3775  0.7662  0.6418  0.4535  0.5632  0.8447       
  Average  Coef.  25.380  2.5216  -4.5622  -0.0812  0.2887  -28.589  -13.314  0.3408  1.8370 
Hedger  profit  Prob.   0.5932  0.6246  0.7904  0.9385  0.8548  0.0258  0.8061     
  Profit  Coef.  66.193  0.5115  -14.229  0.4727  0.8518  -30.773  -17.569  0.1347  2.0680 
  trade  Prob.   0.1045  0.9078  0.3335  0.6002  0.5288  0.0052  0.7055     
  Average  Coef.  -8.1343  -0.8392  5.1157  -0.5426  -1.5313  12.491  62.172  0.6682  1.5440 
Speculator  profit  Prob.   0.8905  0.8797  0.8694  0.6118  0.5125  0.3180  0.6018     
  Profit  Coef.  -52.582  -0.3300  12.938  -0.5783  -1.1283  17.443  28.987  0.3227  2.0570 
  trade  Prob.   0.2249  0.9353  0.5703  0.4604  0.5101  0.0574  0.7398     
  Average  Coef.  0.5252  -1.1821  3.7974  0.1573  -0.4434  -0.1180  -161.44  0.1205  1.9160 
Market   profit  Prob.   0.9834  0.4616  0.8321  0.6278  0.9326  0.9759  0.0159     
Maker  Profit  Coef.  37.822  1.8713  -25.596  -0.2179  -6.2998  -2.1435  -59.439  0.0264  1.9650 
  trade  Prob.   0.1896  0.3057  0.2095  0.5549  0.2910  0.6297  0.4334     
Panel A: Bid    C  Q  TV  Std Q  Std TV  Std P  D  PValue  DW 
  Average  Coef.  -124.68  0.9521  18.196  -0.0707  -0.9462  26.655  41.680  0.2766  2.0190 
Client  profit  Prob.   0.0045  0.8290  0.3745  0.9401  0.5117  0.0222  0.4047     
  Profit  Coef.  -184.24  -0.3715  52.341  -0.4130  -2.0493  29.682  -12.183  0.0196  2.1100 
  trade  Prob.   0.0000  0.9313  0.0092  0.6530  0.1461  0.0092  0.8030     
Firm  Average  Coef.  160.52  -7.9732  -10.588  1.3676  5.0756  -53.334  -136.08  0.2616  1.9620 
  profit  Prob.   0.0463  0.3133  0.7241  0.4207  0.3660  0.0149  0.6195     
  Profit  Coef.  280.48  -4.4444  -55.807  0.4748  8.5710  -58.661  -140.28  0.0098  2.0220 
  trade  Prob.   0.0002  0.5447  0.0456  0.7632  0.1006  0.0040  0.5813     
Pro  Average  Coef.  -12.538  0.4137  16.378  -0.2812  0.3575  0.1072    0.7412  1.9320 
  profit  Prob.   0.6961  0.7724  0.5022  0.3576  0.9734  0.9779       
  Profit  Coef.  27.013  0.8279  -11.465  -0.3438  5.5310  -0.2964    0.8207  2.0220 
  trade  Prob.   0.3965  0.5597  0.6358  0.2571  0.6034  0.9383       
Hedger  Average  Coef.  36.850  -0.9715  -0.3479  0.5765  0.0779  -30.775  -17.191  0.3390  1.8420 
  profit  Prob.   0.4237  0.8384  0.9845  0.5784  0.9621  0.0178  0.7678     
  Profit  Coef.  69.355  -1.8266  -9.7559  0.9734  0.4283  -32.241  -5.0532  0.1182  2.0540 
  trade  Prob.   0.0792  0.6543  0.5254  0.2735  0.7605  0.0038  0.9193     
Speculator  Average  Coef.  -10.911  1.2439  0.6629  -1.0037  -1.2623  14.237  54.240  0.6090  1.5390 
  profit  Prob.   0.8539  0.8016  0.9835  0.3244  0.5940  0.2638  0.6501     
  Profit  Coef.  -55.256  0.1011  13.772  -0.7498  -1.0708  17.959  23.062  0.2732  2.0460 
  trade  Prob.   0.2035  0.9778  0.5568  0.3148  0.5370  0.0547  0.7923     
  Average  Coef.  -0.1091  1.1906  -5.2203  -0.2607  -0.4202  1.0497  -151.65  0.1121  1.9310 
Market   profit  Prob.   0.9966  0.3721  0.7583  0.3817  0.9360  0.7918  0.0246     
Maker  Profit  Coef.  30.657  3.8476  -30.007  -0.5564  -7.8699  -0.3455  -35.035  0.0026  1.9910 
  trade  Prob.   0.2851  0.0109  0.1176  0.0985  0.1831  0.9386  0.6443     
Table 3.1 OLS Estimates of the Regression of SXF Transaction Costs with Measures of Trading Activity and 
Limit Orders. 
Notes: OLS estimates of the regression of SXF daily transaction profit/Cost in C$ per contract and measures of 
trading activity and limit order are presented. In the table, TV is Mean Trade Volume. Q is the daily mean 
quantity of Best 1 Ask for Panel A and Best 1 Bid for Panel B. D is a dummy variable, which equals 1 when TV 
+3 * Std TV > Q + 3 *Std Q. Std stands for standard deviation. DW is Durbin-Watson stat. PValue is the p value 
of the regression. P is transaction price. Profit trade is daily FIFO profit for each account type of Firm, Client, 
Pro, Hedger, Speculator and Market Maker. Average profit is the weight average profits of the FIFO profit and 
the profits of daily inventory imbalance settled at the closing price. The number of contracts traded or settled is 
used as the weight. C is constant term in the OLS model. The best bid price is defined as the highest price a 
prospective buyer is prepared to pay at a particular time for trading the futures contract. In the analyses, Best 1 
Bid is defined as the best bid depth, which corresponds to the sum of all bid sizes (number of contracts) that are 
submitted as limit orders for trading at the best bid price for market participant bid quotations that are equal to 
the best bid price. The best ask (or offer) price is the lowest price at which someone who owns the contract 
offers to sell it. Best 1 Ask is the best ask depth, which is the sum of all ask sizes (number of contracts) that are 
submitted as limit orders to trade at the best ask price for market participant ask quotations that are equal to the 
best ask price. Value in Bold indicates significant at 5 percent level. Data for 356 trading days are used in the 
regression. International Econometric Review (IER) 
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Since a buy /sell in an aggregated account could be closed but then immediately followed a 
sell/buy,  our  FIFO  cost  estimate  is  largely  immune  to  any  informational  effects.  As  an 
extreme example, suppose an investor in the Client account buys 30 contracts of SXFH; then 
suppose  that  immediately  after  a  millisecond,  another  investor  in  Client  account  sells  30 
contracts  of  SXFH.  The  position  in  the  Client  account  is  closed  in  a  millisecond.  The 
calculated FIFO costs in this case will reflect only liquidity costs.  
 
In this work, we first sort the records by the date and hour, and then by milliseconds to get the 
FIFO transaction series for a daily session. The last average of bid and ask price is used as the 
closing price on the trading day
2.  
 
Many previous studies  suggest that trading acti vity increases market liquidity . However, 
accurate measures of trading activity, such as trading volume per transaction are not available, 
and as a result, activity levels are usually measured by the number of transactions (McInish  
and Wood, 1992). In contrast, our data include the trading volume per transaction for each 
account type and the actual price executed, which we can use as the independent variables as 
specified in our model of the determinants of trading costs.  
 
In particular, to further investigate the relationship between the transaction costs and trading 
activity, we estimate the following regression model: 
                D P Std TV Std Q Std TV Q C Costs       5 4 3 2 1   (3.1) 
where Costs is our measures of transaction costs; C is constant term; Q is the daily mean 
quantity of Best 1 Ask or Bid; TV is mean trade volume per transaction on each day; P is 
transaction price; and D is a dummy variable, which equals 1 when TV +3 * StdTV > Q + 3 
*StdQ. Std stands for standard deviation for the above measures. 
 
OLS estimation results on both the Bid and Ask sides for three aggregated account types of 
Client, Pro, Firm and transaction by Hedger, Speculator and Market Maker are presented in 
Table 3.1. The results are similar whether we use the measures of Bid side or the measures of 
Ask side. Overall, the regression results show virtually no relationship between transaction 
costs  and  measures  of  market  activity  for  the  SXF.  Most  coefficients  of  market  activity 
measures are insignificant at 5 percent level.  
 
3.2. Limit Order Quotes and Trading of the SXF 
 
Why  are  transactions  costs  unrelated  to  measures  of  trading  activity?  In  this  section,  we 
explore the role of limit orders. In Table 3.2 we provide summary statistics on limit order 
quotes and limit order size. For each trading day, we cumulate the records of each limit order 
quote and limit order quantity that is submitted over the day. Table 3.2 reports the cumulative 
averages across all trading days in the sample. As is shown in the table, the Best 1 and 2 
variables,  which  capture  the  number  of  contracts  submitted  as  limited orders  at  best  and 
second best prices for market participants are similar on the bid and ask sides (Panel A vs. 
Panel B).  
 
In addition, the average of daily standard deviation of limit order quantity (Average Std Q), 
the average of maximum quantity of limit order in each trading day (Average max Q) or the 
mean of daily standard deviation of the average size of limit order per order (Std Average 
Size) are similar on the bid and the ask side. 
                                                 
















Panel A: Bid Jan 05 - May 06 
Best 1  10.95  4.06  27.00  5.41  294.18  356 
Best 2  11.47  4.49  11.02  4.58  134.40  356 
Best 1 and 2  11.23  4.28  21.01  5.10  300.01  356 
Panel B: Ask Jan 05 - May 06 
Best 1  10.24  4.00  26.76  5.60  287.63  356 
Best 2  9.65  4.14  10.10  4.52  121.62  356 
Best 1 and 2  9.95  4.07  20.50  5.17  288.51  356 
Panel C: Bid Jan 05 - May 05 
Best 1  13.86  4.72  34.99  6.23  326.31  104 
Best 2  14.02  5.19  13.29  5.27  127.52  104 
Best 1 and 2  13.93  4.95  27.16  5.85  326.61  104 
Panel D: Ask Jan 05 - May 05 
Best 1  13.20  4.67  34.93  6.51  336.88  104 
Best 2  12.07  4.72  12.64  5.27  132.79  104 
Best 1 and 2  12.66  4.70  26.86  6.09  337.27  104 
Panel E: Bid Jan 06 - May 06 
Best 1  9.34  3.61  23.77  4.79  291.52  105 
Best 2  9.58  4.09  10.19  4.64  162.99  105 
Best 1 and 2  9.48  3.86  18.40  4.77  309.95  105 
Panel F: Ask Jan 06 - May 06 
Best 1  8.48  3.54  23.18  5.21  267.90  105 
Best 2  7.72  3.79  8.70  4.49  117.29  105 
Best 1 and 2  8.09  3.67  17.53  4.92  268.07  105 
Table 3.2 Summary statistics for SXF limit orders. 
Notes: Summary statistics for limit order quotes for the SXF are shown. Daily statistics are used to calculate the 
averages. Average mean Q is the average of daily mean quantity of limit orders. Average Std Q is the average 
daily standard deviation of limit order quantities. Average max Q is the average of the maximum quantity of 
limit orders in each trading day. Mean Average Size is the mean of the daily average size of limit order per 
order. Std Average Size is the mean of daily standard deviation of the average size of limit order per order. The 
best bid price is defined as the highest price a prospective buyer is prepared to pay at a particular time for trading 
the futures contract. In the analyses, the variable Best 1 Bid is defined as the best bid depth, which corresponds 
to the sum of all bid sizes (number of contracts) that are submitted as limit orders for trading at the best bid price 
for market participant bid quotations that are equal to the best bid price. Best 2 Bid is the second best bid depth, 
and so forth. The best ask (or offer) price is the lowest price at which someone who owns the contract offers to 
sell it. We define Best 1 Ask as the best ask depth, which is the sum of all ask sizes (number of contracts) that 
are submitted as limit orders to trade at the best ask price for market participant ask quotations that are equal to 
the best ask price. Best2 ask is the second best ask depth. Best 1and 2 combine the records of the Best 1 limit 
order and the Best 2 limit order. The sample consists of 356 days from January 04, 2005 to May 30, 2006. 
Statistics of two sub-periods from Jan. 05 to May 05 and from Jan. 06 to May 06 are also presented. 
 
Summary statistics for transactions cumulated on a daily basis are provided in Table 3.3. As 
shown in the panel A of the table, for the entire market (All account), the average of daily 
mean of the number of the nearby SXF contract traded per transaction (Mean Trade Volume) 
is 2.49 contracts and the average maximum number of the nearby SXF contract traded per 
transaction on each trading day (Max Trade Volume) is 262.92 contracts.  
 
The Client category has a higher value in the average of the daily number of the nearby SXF 
contract traded (Number Trading) than the Firm, Pro, Hedger, Speculator or Market Maker 
categories. It is therefore quite obvious that Market Makers/Pros do not precipitate all Client 
transactions. Moreover, the Pro/Market Maker category exhibits the lowest values in Mean 
Trade  Volume,  Max  Trade  Volume  and  Std  Trade  Volume  (the  average  of  the  standard 
deviation of the number of nearby SXF contract traded per transaction on each day) across the International Econometric Review (IER) 
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six account types. These results suggest that Pros/Market Makers do not adjust their inventory 
level by incurring additional costs with a few large orders. 
 
We also present the average of weighted price of the SXF transaction in our sample period 
with  the  weights  determined  by  the  number  of  contracts  traded  (Ave  Weight  Price),  the 
average  of  daily  mean  transaction  price  (Mean  Price),  the  average  of  the  daily  standard 
deviation of transaction price (Std Price), the average of the minimum transaction price on 
each day (Min Price) and the average of the maximum transaction price on each day (Max 
Price), respectively, in Table 3.3. Overall, the market of the SXF is not particularly volatile in 
our sample period: The average standard deviation of transaction price (Std Price) is only 
about 1.5; and the differences between Min Price and Mean Price or the differences between 
























Price  Obs 
Panel A: Jan. 05 - May 06  
All account  2236.79  2.49  262.92  7.98  597.14  597.13  593.97  600.38  1.52  356 
Client  1664.43  2.67  253.67  9.05  597.14  597.14  593.99  600.36  1.52  356 
Pro  1358.41  1.76  14.58  1.35  597.11  597.11  594.00  600.29  1.51  356 
Firm  716.28  3.20  114.45  6.36  597.15  597.13  594.06  600.24  1.49  356 
Hedger  1216.49  3.03  229.31  9.56  597.14  597.13  594.01  600.34  1.50  356 
Speculator  1485.96  2.40  112.43  4.73  597.14  597.13  593.99  600.31  1.53  356 
Market Maker  1065.37  1.67  16.71  1.27  597.13  597.12  594.02  600.26  1.50  356 
Panel B: Jan. 05 - May 05  
All account  1749.63  2.76  235.84  8.19  524.22  524.23  521.92  526.59  1.14  104 
Client  1174.05  3.06  233.16  9.76  524.23  524.25  521.94  526.58  1.14  104 
Pro  1176.63  1.94  21.68  1.72  524.23  524.23  521.94  526.57  1.13  104 
Firm  540.65  3.67  121.99  7.58  524.21  524.20  521.98  526.54  1.13  104 
Hedger  781.13  3.59  181.03  9.98  524.22  524.23  521.97  526.55  1.13  104 
Speculator  1167.19  2.72  152.11  6.36  524.23  524.23  521.94  526.58  1.15  104 
Market Maker  995.32  1.87  22.99  1.57  524.24  524.24  521.95  526.57  1.12  104 
Panel C: Jan. 06 - May 06  
All account  2873.98  2.19  323.30  7.97  672.55  672.53  668.54  676.68  1.89  105 
Client  2227.10  2.30  318.89  9.00  672.55  672.53  668.56  676.66  1.89  105 
Pro  1644.37  1.61  11.46  1.22  672.50  672.51  668.56  676.42  1.89  105 
Firm  938.72  2.72  104.17  5.09  672.54  672.54  668.65  676.35  1.84  105 
Hedger  1675.73  2.52  310.85  10.00  672.56  672.53  668.57  676.62  1.85  105 
Speculator  1970.10  2.13  80.67  3.28  672.53  672.54  668.56  676.44  1.91  105 
Market Maker  1180.10  1.44  13.20  0.97  672.51  672.52  668.62  676.39  1.87  105 
Table 3.3 Summary Statistics for SXF Trading. 
Notes: Summary statistics for daily transactions for SXF are presented. Number Trading is the average of the 
daily number of nearby SXF contracts traded. Mean Trade Volume is the average of daily mean of the number of 
nearby SXF contract traded per transaction. Max Trade Volume is the average maximum number of nearby SXF 
contract traded per transaction on each trading day. Std Trade Volume is the average of the standard deviation of 
the number of nearby SXF contracts traded per transaction on each day. Ave Weight Price is the average of 
weighted price of SXF transactions in our sample period with the weight determined by the number of contracts 
traded. Mean Price, Std Price, Min Price and Max Price are the average of daily mean transaction price, the 
average of daily standard deviation of transaction price, the average of the minimum transaction price on each 
day and the average of the maximum transaction price on each day, respectively. Client, Firm, Pro, Hedger, 
Speculator and Market Maker are the aggregated account indicators that either buy or sell are the transactions by 
Client, Firm Pro, Hedger, Speculator or Market Maker respectively. All account is for the transactions in overall 
market participants. The sample consists of 356 days from January 04, 2005 to May 30, 2006. Statistics of two 
sub-periods from Jan. 05 to May 05 and from Jan. 06 to May 06 are also presented.  Switzer and Fan-Limit Orders, Trading Activity, and Transactions Costs in Equity Futures in … 
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Goettler et al. (2005) assert that the midpoint of the bid–ask spread is not a good proxy for the 
asset’s true value. Instead, the transaction price is closer to the true value of the asset. Table 
3.3 shows that Ave Weight Price is close to Mean Price; therefore, there is no evidence that 
the aggregated participants in any account category has persistent informational advantage 
over  others.  This  result  is  consistent  with  Gilbert  and  Rijken  (2006),  who  show  that 
asymmetric information is less important in index futures markets.  
 
Most important is that the Mean Trade Volume in Table 3.3 is much less than the Average 
mean Q in Table 3.2; furthermore, the Mean Trade Volume is markedly smaller than the 
Mean Average Size of the Best 1 quote. Hence, the Best 1 quote seems to play a key role in 
the SXF’s market liquidity.  
 
  Account 
Trading volume Less than the Best 1 limit order in trading days 
Mean quote 
Mean plus 1 sd of 
quote 














Panel A: Ask Jan. 05 -May 06 
Mean plus 3 sd of 
Trading volume 
All  41  11.52%  306  85.96%  324  91.01% 
Client  24  6.74%  300  84.27%  323  90.73% 
Firm  16  4.49%  321  90.17%  348  97.75% 
Pro  347  97.47%  356  100.00%  356  100.00% 
Hedger  21  5.90%  293  82.30%  325  91.29% 
Speculator  55  15.45%  345  96.91%  350  98.31% 
Market 
Maker  343  96.35%  354  99.44%  355  99.72% 
 
Panel B: Bid Jan. 05 -May 06 
Mean plus 3 sd of 
Trading volume 
All  54  15.17%  308  86.52%  324  91.01% 
Client  41  11.52%  301  84.55%  323  90.73% 
Firm  15  4.21%  329  92.42%  347  97.47% 
Pro  354  99.44%  356  100.00%  356  100.00% 
Hedger  23  6.46%  299  83.99%  327  91.85% 
Speculator  74  20.79%  344  96.63%  350  98.31% 
Market 
Maker  346  97.19%  355  99.72%  355  99.72% 
Table 3.4 Daily Trading Volume vs. the Best 1 Limit Order.  
Notes: This table compares the daily mean plus 3 standard derivation of trading volume per transaction with 
daily Mean, daily Mean plus 1 standard derivation and daily Mean plus 3 standard derivation of limit order per 
record on both the Bid and Ask sides. The Best 1 limit order combines the Best 1 Bid and Best Ask 1 variables. 
The best bid price is defined as the highest price a prospective buyer is prepared to pay at a particular time for 
trading the futures contract. In the analyses, the variable Best 1 Bid is defined as the best bid depth, which 
corresponds to the sum of all bid sizes (number of contracts) that are submitted as limit orders for trading at the 
best bid price for market participant bid quotations that are equal to the best bid price. The best ask (or offer) 
price is the lowest price at which someone who owns the contract offers to sell it. We define Best1 Ask as the 
best ask depth, which is the sum of all ask sizes (number of contracts) that are submitted as limit orders to trade 
at the best ask price for market participant ask quotations that are equal to the best ask price. Column Number 
days are the number of days that Mean plus 3 sd of Trading volume is less than or equal to the Mean quote, 
Mean plus 1 sd of quote or Mean plus 3 sd of quote of limit order. Percent of sample day is based on actual 
trading day. The sample consists of 356 days from January 04, 2005 to May 30, 2006. Statistics of two sub-
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  Account 
Trading volume Less than the best 1 limit order in trading days 
Mean quote 
Mean plus 1 sd of 
quote 














Panel C: Ask Jan. 05 -May 05 
Mean plus 3 sd of 
Trading volume 
All  18  17.31%  97  93.27%  100  96.15% 
Client  11  10.58%  95  91.35%  99  95.19% 
Firm  11  10.58%  98  94.23%  101  97.12% 
Pro  103  99.04%  104  100.00%  104  100.00% 
Hedger  8  7.69%  94  90.38%  101  97.12% 
Speculator  20  19.23%  100  96.15%  101  97.12% 
Market 
Maker  101  97.12%  104  100.00%  104  100.00% 
 
Panel D: Bid Jan. 05 -May 05           
Mean plus 3 sd of 
Trading volume 
All  23  22.12%  97  93.27%  99  95.19% 
Client  20  19.23%  95  91.35%  99  95.19% 
Firm  9  8.65%  98  94.23%  101  97.12% 
Pro  104  100.00%  104  100.00%  104  100.00% 
Hedger  9  8.65%  95  91.35%  101  97.12% 
Speculator  29  27.88%  100  96.15%  101  97.12% 
Market 
Maker  103  99.04%  104  100.00%  104  100.00% 
Table 3.4 (Cont.) Daily Trading Volume vs. the Best 1 Limit Order. 
Notes: This table compares the daily mean plus 3 standard derivation of trading volume per transaction with 
daily Mean, daily Mean plus 1 standard derivation and daily Mean plus 3 standard derivation of bid and ask limit 
orders per record. The Best 1 limit order combines the Best 1 Bid and Best Ask 1 variables. The best bid price is 
defined as the highest price a prospective buyer is prepared to pay at a particular time for trading the futures 
contract. In the analyses, the variable Best 1 Bid is defined as the best bid depth, which corresponds to the sum 
of all bid sizes (number of contracts) that are submitted as limit orders for trading at the best bid price for market 
participant bid quotations that are equal to the best bid price. The best ask (or offer) price is the lowest price at 
which someone who owns the contract offers to sell it. We define Best 1 Ask as the best ask depth, which is the 
sum of all ask sizes (number of contracts) that are submitted as limit orders to trade at the best ask price for 
market participant ask quotations that are equal to the best ask price. Column Number days are the number of 
days that Mean plus 3 sd of Trading volume is less than or equal to Mean quote, Mean plus 1 sd of quote or 
Mean plus 3 sd of quote of limit order. Percent of sample day is based on actual trading days. The sample 
consists of 356 days from January 04, 2005 to May 30, 2006. Statistics of two sub-periods from Jan. 05 to May 
05 and from Jan. 06 to May 06 are also presented. 
 
The liquidity providing role of the Best 1 limit order is more obvious for Pros and Market 
Makers. The Mean Trade Volume plus three times the Std Trade Volume for the Pro category 
is 5.81 (1.76+3*1.35) contracts per transaction, which about half of the 10.95 contracts of the 
Average mean Q on the Best 1 quote. The Best 1 quote provides enough liquidity for market 
makers. 
 
In addition, the values of Max Trade Volume for the whole sample period (Panel A of Table 
3.3) are all less than 294.18 of the Average max Q for Best 1.This fact also implies that 
participants in the SXF must reference their trades to the best 1 limit order. In other words, 
investors  with  large  positions  or  investors  who  want  to  build  a  large  position  have  to 
strategically split large orders to close/build their position, according to the depth of the best 1 
limit order, to ameliorate price impact and information leakage effects.  
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  Account 
Trading volume Less than the best 1 limit order in  trading days 
Mean quote 
Mean plus 1 sd of 
quote 














Panel E: Ask     Jan. 06 -May 06 
Mean plus 3 sd of 
Trading volume 
All  11  10.48%  85  80.95%  94  89.52% 
Client  8  7.62%  81  77.14%  94  89.52% 
Firm  2  1.90%  96  91.43%  104  99.05% 
Pro  100  95.24%  105  100.00%  105  100.00% 
Hedger  10  9.52%  79  75.24%  91  86.67% 
Speculator  13  12.38%  104  99.05%  105  100.00% 
Market 
Maker  101  96.19%  105  100.00%  105  100.00% 
 
Panel F:     Bid Jan. 06 -May 06           
Mean plus 3 sd of 
Trading volume 
All  18  17.14%  87  82.86%  94  89.52% 
Client  12  11.43%  84  80.00%  94  89.52% 
Firm  2  1.90%  97  92.38%  103  98.10% 
Pro  105  100.00%  105  100.00%  105  100.00% 
Hedger  11  10.48%  82  78.10%  93  88.57% 
Speculator  16  15.24%  104  99.05%  105  100.00% 
Market 
Maker  103  98.10%  105  100.00%  105  100.00% 
Table 4 (Cont.): Daily Trading Volume vs. the Best 1 Limit Order. 
Notes: Comparisons of daily mean plus 3 standard derivation of trading volume per transaction with daily Mean, 
daily Mean plus 1 standard derivation and daily Mean plus 3 standard derivation of limit order per record on 
both Bid and Ask side are shown. The Best 1 limit order combines the Best 1 Bid and  Best Ask 1 variables. The 
best bid price is defined as the highest price a prospective buyer is prepared to pay at a particular time for trading 
the futures contract.   In the analyses, the variable Best 1 Bid is defined as the best bid depth, which corresponds 
to the sum of all bid sizes (number of contracts) that are submitted as limit orders for trading at the best bid price 
for market participant bid quotations that are equal to the best bid price. The best ask (or offer) price is the 
lowest price at which someone who owns the contract offers to sell it.  Best 1 Ask is the best ask depth, which is 
the sum of all ask sizes (number of contracts) that are submitted as limit orders to trade at the best ask price for 
market participant ask quotations that are equal to the best ask price. Column Number days are the number of 
days that Mean plus 3 sd of Trading volume is less than or equal to Mean quote, Mean plus 1 sd of quote or 
Mean plus 3 sd of quote of limit order. Percent of sample day is based on actual trading days. The sample 
consists of 356 days from January 04, 2005 to May 30, 2006. Statistics of two sub-periods from Jan. 05 to May 
05 and from Jan. 06 to May 06 are also presented.  
 
The role of limit orders, especially the best 1 limit order, in providing enough liquidity and 
determining participants’ trading behaviour is also illustrated in Table 3.4, which examines 
the relationship between trading volume and the best 1 limit order on each trading day of our 
356 sample days. We find that, in more than 80 percent of the 356 trading days in the sample, 
the daily mean plus 3 standard deviation of trading volume per transaction (Mean plus 3 sd of 
Trading volume ) is less than the daily mean plus one standard deviation of best1 limit order 
(Mean plus 1 sd of quote) per record; and, in more than 90 percent of trading days, the daily 
mean plus 3 standard deviation of trading volume are less than the daily mean plus 3 standard 
deviation of best1 limit order (Mean plus 3 sd of quote). Sophisticated investors in this market 
(Pro and Market Maker) seem more likely to conduct their transactions at the best 1 limit 
order quote.  
 
Table  3.5  presents  additional  evidence  that  the  best  1  limit  order  for  the  SXF  is  a  key 
determinant  of  the  market  liquidity.  In  356  trading  days,  almost  every  day  shows  mean 
trading volume per transaction (Mean Trade Volume) less than the daily mean of the best 1 International Econometric Review (IER) 
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limit order per record on both Bid and Ask side for every aggregated accounts or the market 
as a whole (All).  
 
Account  All  Client  Firm  Pro  Hedger  Speculator 
Market 
Maker 
Panel A: Ask Jan. 05 - May 06 
Number days  356  354  355  356  353  356  356 
Percent of sample day  100.0%  99.4%  99.7%  100.0%  99.2%  100.0%  100.0% 
Panel B: Bid Jan. 05 - May 06 
Number days  356  356  356  356  354  356  356 
Percent of sample day  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  99.4%  100.0%  100.0% 
Panel C: Ask Jan. 05 - May 05 
Number days  104  103  104  104  102  104  104 
Percent of sample day  100.0%  99.0%  100.0%  100.0%  98.1%  100.0%  100.0% 
Panel D: Bid Jan. 05 - May 05 
Number days  104  104  104  104  102  104  104 
Percent of sample day  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  98.1%  100.0%  100.0% 
Panel E: Ask Jan. 06 - May 06 
Number days  105  105  105  105  105  105  105 
Percent of sample day  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
Panel F: Bid Jan. 06 - May 06 
Number days  105  105  105  105  105  105  105 
Percent of sample day  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
Table 3.5: Comparison of Daily Mean Trading Volume with Daily Mean Best 1 Limit Order. 
Notes: Comparisons of daily mean trading volume per transaction with daily mean of the Best 1 limit order per 
record on both Bid and Ask side are shown. The Best 1 limit order combines the Best 1 Bid and Best Ask 1 
variables. The best bid price is defined as the highest price a prospective buyer is prepared to pay at a particular 
time for trading the futures contract. In the analyses, the variable Best 1 Bid is defined as the best bid depth, 
which corresponds to the sum of all bid sizes (number of contracts) that are submitted as limit orders for trading 
at the best bid price for market participant bid quotations that are equal to the best bid price. The best ask (or 
offer) price is the lowest price at which someone who owns the contract offers to sell it. Best 1 Ask is the best 
ask depth, which is the sum of all ask sizes (number of contracts) that are submitted as limit orders to trade at the 
best ask price for market participant ask quotations that are equal to the best ask price. Number days are the 
number of days that mean trading volume is less than or equal to the mean quote of the limit order. Percent of 
sample day is based on actual trading days. 
 
To recap, it is quite evident that the best 1 limit order provides is a central determinant of the 
liquidity of the market. As shown above, most transactions have the order size that is much 
smaller that the sizes of the Best 1 limit order. To further highlight this issue, in Table 3.6, we 
show that there is a significantly positive correlation between daily mean trading volume per 
transaction (Mean Trade Volume) and mean Best  1 limit  order on either bid  side (Mean 
BIDQ) or ask side (Mean ASKQ). 
 
Ahn et al. (2001) show that transitory volatility arises mainly from the paucity of limit orders 
at the best queue. Our finding in Table 3.6 of a significantly negative correlation between best 
1 quotes (Mean BIDQ and Mean ASKQ) and the volatility of transaction prices (Std Price) 
consistent with Ahn et al. (2001)
3. 
                                                 
3 This result is also in line with Biais et al. (1995) who find more trades occurred when the order book is thick, 
and more limit orders submitted when the book is thin. Hedvall and Niemeyer (1997) also report the presence of 
traders watching the limit order book and provide liquidity when spreads are large. Chung et al. (1999) find that, 
in the NYSE, more investors enter limit orders when the spread is wide, and more investors hit the quotes when 
the spread is tight. Gomber et al. (2004) find that large transactions are timed when liquidity is unusually high. In 
addition, Gilbert and Rijken (2006) state that firms need to trade more actively under the screen system if they 


























Mean BIDQ  1                   
Mean ASKQ  0.864  1                 
Mean Trade 
Volume  0.487  0.397  1               
Max BIDQ  0.513  0.519  0.166  1             
Max ASKQ  0.513  0.576  0.186  0.522  1           
Max Trade 
Volume  0.022  -0.023  0.591  -0.027  -0.037  1         
Std BIDQ  0.836  0.866  0.299  0.725  0.654  -0.010  1       
Std ASKQ  0.791  0.863  0.276  0.624  0.819  -0.019  0.941  1     
Std Trade 
Volume  0.082  0.017  0.739  -0.021  -0.018  0.948  0.017  0.007  1   
Std Price  -0.192  -0.160  -0.184  0.070  0.062  -0.033  -0.020  -0.028  -0.100  1 
Table 3.6 Correlation Matrix. 
Notes: Correlation between trading activity and the Best 1 limit order is present. The sample has a total of 356 days from 
January 04, 2005 to May 30, 2006. Mean BidQ and Mean AskQ are the daily mean quantity of the Best 1 Bid or the Best 1 
Ask per record in the data file; Std BidQ and Std AskQ are the daily standard deviation of the quantities of the Best 1 Bid or 
the Best 1 Ask per record in the data file; In the analyses, the variable Best 1 Bid is defined as the best bid depth, which 
corresponds to the sum of all bid sizes (number of contracts) that are submitted as limit orders for trading at the best bid price 
for market participant bid quotations that are equal to the best bid price. The best ask (or offer) price is the lowest price at 
which someone who owns the contract offers to sell it. Best 1 Ask is the best ask depth, which is the sum of all ask sizes 
(number of contracts) that are submitted as limit orders to trade at the best ask price for market participant ask quotations that 
are equal to the best ask price. Std Price is the daily standard deviation of transaction prices; Std Trade Volume is the 
standard deviation of the number of the SXF contract traded per transaction on each day. 356 daily data are used in the test. 
Absolute  Pearson  correlations  are  significant  for  critical  values  in  excess  of  .1046  (.1368)  at  the  5%  (1%)  level  of 
significance. 
 
Foucault et al. (2005) argue that, in equilibrium, patient traders tend to submit limit orders, 
whereas impatient traders submit market orders. Markets with a high proportion of patient 
traders (as is the case here) or a small order arrival rate are more resilient.  
 
Table 3.6 also shows that the pair-wise correlations among Std BIDQ, Std ASKQ, Std Trade 
Volume and Std Price are close to zero. These results are consistent with our conclusion that 
the best 1 limit orders are the central drivers of the SXF market. The majority of participants 
in the SXF market either make their trading decisions with respect to the best 1 limit order 
quote on the screen or adjust their trading behaviour in accordance with this quote. This is 
also consistent with Locke and Sarkar (2001) and Bortoli et al. (2006)
4. 
 
In sum, our inability to find any significant relationship between (carefully measured), 
transaction costs with measures of trading activities is consistent with the market operating 
during a period of normal volatility, with the limit order book (Best 1 quotes) supplying 
adequate liquidity, where buy and sell orders are consummated at the Best 1 quotes.  
 
In Table 3.7, we test the different measures of the best 1 order and trading of the SXF market 
for unit roots market by using the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test with four lags for the 
356 daily data. 
 
As shown in the table, all the measures show mean reversion in our sample period when an 
intercept is included in the test. Moreover, we find significant p value of less than 0.01 for all 
                                                 
4 Locke and Sarkar (2001) examine the provision of liquidity in futures markets as price volatility changes and 
find that customer trading costs do not increase with volatility. They conclude that there is adequate liquidity 
during volatile periods in electronic systems International Econometric Review (IER) 
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measures when an intercept and trend model is used to the tests
5. The unit root test results are 
consistent with a dynamic competitive equilibrium process for the SXF market, where shocks 













Intercept None  Intercept None  Intercept None  Intercept None  Intercept  None 
Panel A: Market 
SXF 
Mean BidQ  Mean AskQ  Std BidQ  Std AskQ  Std Price 
0.000  0.086  0.000  0.097  0.000  0.007  0.000  0.007  0.000  0.187 
Panel B: Account Type  
Variable  All  Client   Firm   Pro     
Number 
Trade  0.001  0.344  0.001  0.293  0.001  0.340  0.000  0.314    
Mean Trade 
Volume  0.000  0.263  0.000  0.182  0.000  0.278  0.003  0.458    
Std Trade 
Volume   0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.078    
Variable  Hedger  Speculator  Market Maker         
Number 
Trade  0.002  0.238  0.005  0.397  0.000  0.275        
Mean Trade 
Volume  0.000  0.175  0.000  0.318  0.005  0.398        
Std Trade 
Volume   0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.006        
Table 3.7 Unit Root Tests on the Daily Measures of the SXF Market Activity. 
Notes:  MacKinnon  (1996)  one-sided  p-values  of  Augmented  Dickey-Fuller  tests  with  four  lags  on  daily 
measures of the SXF market activity are presented. Column Intercept and None are the results of Augmented 
Dickey-Fuller model with or without intercept respectively. In Panel A, Mean BidQ and Mean AskQ are the daily 
mean quantity of the best1 Bid or the best1 Ask per record in the data file; Std BidQ and Std AskQ are the daily 
standard deviation of the quantities of the best1 Bid or the best1 Ask per record in the data file; Std Price is the 
daily standard deviation of transaction prices. In Panel B, Column All is the transaction by all participants in the 
SXF market; Client is the results from buy or sale by the aggregated Client; Firm is the results from buy or sale 
by the aggregated Firm; Pro is the results from buy or sale by the aggregated Pro; Hedger is the results from 
transaction by Hedgers, Speculator is the results from transaction by Speculator and Market Maker is the results 
from transaction by Market Maker. In the column Variable, Number Trade is the number of trading on each day; 
Mean Trade Volume is the daily mean of the number of the SXF contract traded per transaction; and Std Trade 
Volume is the standard deviation of the number of the SXF contract traded per transaction on each day. Data 
over 356 trading days are used in the test.  
 
Figure 3.1 and Figure 3.2 illustrate the mean reverting behaviour of the measures of market 
activities in  our sample period;  in  addition, Figure  3.1 also  demonstrates that the size of 
trading per transaction is much less than the sizes of the Best 1 limit orders. 
 
3.3. Cost, Spreads, and Minimum Tick Sizes 
 
To provide further evidence that SXF market is in equilibrium and the inappropriateness of 







                                                 
5 The results for trend and intercept model are not reported in the table to save space. Switzer and Fan-Limit Orders, Trading Activity, and Transactions Costs in Equity Futures in … 
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Figure 3.1 Daily Mean Quantity Changes of Trading and the Best 1 Limit Order 
 
Notes: Figure 3.1 shows the daily mean trading volume (Trade V) per transaction, the daily mean quantity of the 
Best 1 Bid (Bid) and the daily mean quantity of the Best 1 Ask (Ask) per record in the data file over the sample 
period (356 trading days).  
 
Figure 3.2 Daily Volatity Measure Changes of Trading and the Best 1 Limit Order  
 
Notes: Figure 3.2 shows, the daily standard deviation of trading volume per transaction (StdT), the daily standard 
deviation of the Best 1 Ask quantity per record (StdA) and the daily standard deviation of transaction price 
(StdP) are present. The axis of Ask& Trade is for StdT and StdA; the axis of Price is for StdP. The sample has 
356 trading days.  
The best bid price is defined as the highest price a prospective buyer is prepared to pay at a particular time for 
trading the futures contract. In the analyses, the variable Best 1 Bid is defined as the best bid depth, which 
corresponds to the sum of all bid sizes (number of contracts) that are submitted as limit orders for trading at the 
best bid price for market participant bid quotations that are equal to the best bid price. The best ask (or offer) 
price is the lowest price at which someone who owns the contract offers to sell it. Best1 Ask is the best ask 
depth, which is the sum of all ask sizes (number of contracts) that are submitted as limit orders to trade at the 
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Quote Type  Sample Period  mean Spread1  mean Spread2  Std Spread1  Std Spread2 
Best1 
 
Jan. 05 – May 06  0.2503  0.0467  1.1336  0.3226 
Jan.05 - May 05  0.1912  0.0365  0.1079  0.0206 
Jan.06 - May 06  0.3411  0.0674  3.1670  0.9225 
Best2 
 
Jan. 05 – May 06  0.4877  0.0820  0.3513  0.0585 
Jan.05 - May 05  0.4380  0.0836  0.2420  0.0461 
Jan.06 - May 06  0.5182  0.0771  0.3947  0.0589 
Table 3.8 Statistics of the SXF Spreads. 
Notes: Average daily mean and standard deviation of the SXF spreads is present in the table. The best bid price 
is defined as the highest price a prospective buyer is prepared to pay at a particular time for trading the futures 
contract. In the analyses, the variable Best 1 Bid is defined as the best bid depth, which corresponds to the sum 
of all bid sizes (number of contracts) that are submitted as limit orders for trading at the best bid price for market 
participant bid quotations that are equal to the best bid price. Best 2 Bid is the second best bid depth, and so 
forth. The best ask (or offer) price is the lowest price at which someone who owns the contract offers to sell it. 
The SXF minimum tick is 0.05; Spread1 =Ask Price – Bid Price; Spread2= (Ask Price-Bid Price)*2/ (Ask Price 





















  Client  Firm  Pro 
Jan-May 
2005  -35.43  -23.13  -42.76  22.63  43.43  45.69  21.26  8.81  21.33 
Jan-May 
2006  -36.72  -0.29  -22.85  43.01  -16.98  6.96  7.61  15.30  7.11 
All  -34.03  -0.05  -31.69  29.43  -0.14  25.59  13.68  13.28  13.81 
  Hedger  Speculator  Market Maker 
Jan-May 
2005  10.10  15.19  13.41  -19.91  -6.03  -17.15  -0.09  1.92  -1.32 
Jan-May 
2006  9.85  -2.51  -5.69  -20.83  -1.46  -12.10  -12.28  7.67  -6.26 
All  1.46  -20.32  -5.99  -18.58  13.51  -6.07  -2.99  6.03  -2.22 
Table 3.9 Daily Mean Transaction Cost of SXF (C$). 
Notes: Sample periods are 356 days from January 04, 2005 to May 31, 2006. Profit trade is calculated by the 
FIFO rule for each account type. Profit Settled is the assumed profits by settling the closing position (at the end 
of a trading day) at the closing average of bid and ask price of contracts. Average Profit is a weighted average of 
Profit trade and Profit Settled with the weights in accordance with the number of contracts. Costs of the most 
nearby standard SXF contract are present in the table. Minimum Tick of SXF is C$10.00. Two sub-periods of 
the sample from January 2005 to May 2005, from January 2006 to May2006 and for the whole sample period (All) are 
presented. 
 
Table 3.8 shows that the average of daily mean spreads and daily standards deviation of 
spreads for SXF in our sample period. In the table, the Best 1 limit order combines the Best 1 
Bid and Best Ask 1 variables. The best bid price is defined as the highest price a prospective 
buyer is prepared to pay at a particular time for trading the futures contract. In the analyses, 
the variable Best 1 Bid is defined as the best bid depth, which corresponds to the sum of all 
bid sizes (number of contracts) that are submitted as limit orders for trading at the best bid 
price for market participant bid quotations that are equal to the best bid price. The best ask (or 
offer) price is the lowest price at which someone who owns the contract offers to sell it. Best 
1 Ask is the best ask depth, which is the sum of all ask sizes (number of contracts) that are 
submitted as limit orders to trade at the best ask price for market participant ask quotations 
that are equal to the best ask price. We calculate two measures for bid-ask spreads. 
 
  Spread1 =Ask Price – Bid Price  (3.2) 
  Spread2= (Ask Price-Bid Price)*2/(Ask Price + Bid Price)*100  (3.3) 
 




From Table 3.8, we note that the averages of daily mean spread (Spread 1) are much higher 
than the SXF minimum tick of 0.05. Table 3.9 shows that the costs are much higher than the 
value of the SXF minimum tick (C$ 10). 
 
Several empirical papers have examined the impact of tick size changes on market quality. 
For example, Bacidore (1997), Ahn et al. (1998) and Griffiths et al. (1998) study reduction of 
tick size on the TSE in 1996. Goldstein and Kavajecz (2000) and Chordia et al. (2001) show 
that the inside spread significantly decreased, but depth at the best bid and ask also decreased 
after  the  reduction  in  tick  size  of  the  NYSE.  Kurov  and  Zabotina  (2005)  find  that  the 
minimum  tick  sizes  of  the  E-mini  S&P  500  and  E-mini  Nasdaq-100  futures  contracts 
preventing the spreads from decreasing to the levels implied by a competitive market.  In 
addition, Bortoli et al. (2006) report that trading at the minimum tick in the Sydney Futures 
Exchange embraces 87.8% of observations for the SPI, 95.2% for bank-accepted bills, 97.8% 
for three-year bonds, and 94.4% for ten-year bonds in the periods before or after the Sydney 
Futures Exchange changed the limit order disclosure rule.  
 
In the SXF market, however, the spread and costs are much higher than the minimum tick 
size. Hence, it is clear the established spread/ minimum tick size may not be reflective of the 
market at any particular point in time
6. 
 
In addition, from Table 3.8 we note that the average mean daily spreads and the average daily 
standard deviation of the spreads are higher in the first five months of 2006 than those of the 
first five months of 2005. However, the corresponding FIFO costs for all six aggregated 
account types are lower in the first five months of 2006 (Table 3.9). Since more transactions 
could reduce transaction costs, and the trading volume is much higher in the first five months 
of 2006 than those of the first five months of 2005 (Panel B and Panel C of Table  3.3), it is 
evident that trading costs are not well captured by spreads for the SXF market.  
 
In the work, we also perform regression analysis on the costs and spreads with the model of 
Equation 1, substituting the quantity of limit orders ( Q) in the model with Spreads. These 
results are shown in Table 3.10. The lack of significance of the explanatory variables holds 
whether Spread1 or Spread2 is used in the regression; consistent with Locke and Venkatesh 
(1997), daily mean spreads (BA) and standard deviation of daily spreads (std BA) show no 
relationship with transaction costs. 
 
Overall, the results show that traditional spreads have no relationship with the trading costs in 
the SXF market and that the minimum tick size do not act as binding constraints on the bid-
ask spreads and costs. 
 
In fact, spreads as the measures of transaction costs need very strong assumption that all 
transactions  are  go  through  market  makers.  Since  Client  in  our  sample  has  much  more 
transactions than Pro/Market maker, such an assumption clear does not held in SXF market. 
However, our FIFO cost is extensively used in accounting book keeping and is direct measure 
costs. The finding that no relationship between FIFO costs and spreads further supports that 
traditional  spreads  are  inappropriate  as  the  measure  of  trading  costs,  especially  in  a  full 
electronic market. 
                                                 
6 Indeed, shortly after the endpoint of our data, the Exchange raised the minimum tick - the minimum tick 
size was raised to C$20 per tick (minimum tick fluctuation has been increased from 0.05 index points to 




Account  Dependent   Independent Variable       




Coef.  -92.02  -0.82  20.74  0.03  -0.99  29.55  36.77 
0.04  2.00  0.04  Prob.   0.04  0.04  0.20  0.16  0.45  0.01  0.44 
Profit 
trade 
Coef.  -152.4  -0.75  43.10  0.02  -1.70  34.36  -7.30 




Coef.  89.97  1.45  -24.39  -0.05  5.81  -54.65  -143.2 
0.05  1.94  0.04  Prob.   0.27  0.05  0.33  0.22  0.28  0.01  0.58 
Profit 
trade 
Coef.  221.2  1.27  -63.01  -0.03  8.14  -63.59  -102.4 




Coef.  -12.63  0.12  11.93  -0.01  1.23  -0.36   
0.87  1.93  0.01  Prob.   0.70  0.39  0.60  0.40  0.91  0.92   
Profit 
trade 
Coef.  27.94  0.09  -14.38  -0.01  6.78  -0.78   




Coef.  -3.66  1.34  -3.25  -0.07  0.36  -30.11  -22.20 
0.01  1.86  0.04  Prob.   0.94  0.00  0.83  0.00  0.80  0.02  0.68 
Profit 
trade 
Coef.  43.08  0.70  -7.86  -0.02  0.47  -33.54  -16.97 




Coef.  56.62  -1.53  -6.06  0.09  -2.01  9.83  117.1 
0.01  1.59  0.05  Prob.   0.34  0.00  0.80  0.00  0.37  0.42  0.30 
Profit 
trade 
Coef.  -15.79  -0.61  -0.68  0.03  -1.20  18.02  65.84 





Coef.  16.93  -0.10  -10.34  0.00  1.21  1.99  -164.6 
0.00  1.91  0.06  Prob.   0.51  0.47  0.52  0.49  0.81  0.61  0.01 
Profit 
trade 
Coef.  57.53  -0.27  -23.82  0.00  -5.36  -0.50  -72.25 
0.00  1.92  0.07  Prob.   0.05  0.07  0.19  0.76  0.36  0.91  0.33 
Table 3.10 OLS Estimates of the Regression of SXF Transaction Costs with Measures of Trading Activity and 
Spreads 
Notes: OLS estimates of the regression of SXF daily transaction profit/Cost in C$ per contract on measures of 
trading activity and spreads are shown. BA is the daily mean Spread1 of Best 1 for Panel A and is the daily mean 
Spread2 for Panel B. The best bid price is defined as the highest price a prospective buyer is prepared to pay at a 
particular time for trading the futures contract. In the analyses, the variable Best 1 Bid is defined as the best bid 
depth, which corresponds to the sum of all bid sizes (number of contracts) that are submitted as limit orders for 
trading at the best bid price for market participant bid quotations that are equal to the best bid price. Best 2 Bid is 
the second best bid depth, and so forth. The best ask (or offer) price is the lowest price at which someone who 
owns the contract offers to sell it. Best 1 Ask is the best ask depth, which is the sum of all ask sizes (number of 
contracts) that are submitted as limit orders to trade at the best ask price for market participant ask quotations 
that are equal to the best ask price. Best 2 Ask is the second best ask depth; Spread1 =Ask Price – Bid Price; and 
Spread2= (Ask Price-Bid Price)*2/ (Ask Price + Bid Price)*100. TV is Mean Trade Volume. D is a dummy 
variable, which equals 1 when TV +3 * Std TV> Q + 3 *Std Q; and Q is the daily mean quantity of Best 1 Ask for 
Panel A and Best 1 Bid for Panel B; Std stands for standard deviation. P is transaction price. DW is Durbin-
Watson stat. PF is the p value of the regression; RSQ is R square of the regression, Profit trade is daily FIFO 
profit for each account type of Firm, Client, Pro, Hedger, Speculator (Spec) and Market Maker. Average profit is 
the weighted average profits of the FIFO profit and the profits of daily inventory imbalance settled at the closing 
price. The number of contracts traded or settled is used as the weighting variable. C is constant term in the OLS 
model. 356 daily data from January 04, 2005 to May 31, 2006.are used in the regression. Value in Bold indicates 
significant at 5 percent level.  
 
3.4. Analyses of Transactions by Order Type 
 
In the work, we also differentiate SXF transaction across order types with another trade data 
file that recodes each trade with Limit, Market or Market on Opening in the Order Type 
identifier from March 01 2005 to April 28 2006. Table 3.11 summarizes the SXF transactions 
by order type. Switzer and Fan-Limit Orders, Trading Activity, and Transactions Costs in Equity Futures in … 
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Account  Dependent   Independent Variable 




Coef.  -109.0  -639.04  23.72  23.53  -1.12  28.23  35.84 
0.03  2.00  0.04  Prob.   0.01  0.02  0.14  0.10  0.39  0.01  0.45 
Profit 
trade 
Coef.  -167.5  -607.83  45.98  18.01  -1.83  33.14  -8.27 




Coef.  118.6  1118.6  -29.10  -38.06  6.63  -52.19  -184.9 
0.03  1.94  0.04  Prob.   0.13  0.03  0.25  0.15  0.29  0.01  0.57 
Profit 
trade 
Coef.  246.4  986.14  -66.94  -28.21  8.64  -61.51  -125.3 




Coef.  -8.83  84.19  10.72  -4.22  1.20  -0.25   
0.86  1.93  0.01  Prob.   0.78  0.36  0.64  0.38  0.91  0.95   
Profit 
trade 
Coef.  30.42  84.66  -15.50  -5.01  6.81  -0.68   




Coef.  23.26  1022.8  -7.24  -53.63  0.55  -27.80  -15.31 
0.01  1.86  0.05  Prob.   0.60  0.00  0.63  0.00  0.71  0.03  0.77 
Profit 
trade 
Coef.  60.91  494.64  -10.90  -17.29  0.74  -32.70  -23.08 




Coef.  18.47  -1074.4  1.05  63.23  -2.18  7.24  115.3 
0.00  1.59  0.05  Prob.   0.75  0.00  0.96  0.00  0.33  0.55  0.31 
Profit 
trade 
Coef.  -31.59  -404.13  1.96  18.55  -1.26  17.03  64.83 





Coef.  13.46  -79.19  -8.86  -2.62  1.02  1.89  -164.6 
0.00  1.91  0.06  Prob.   0.59  0.39  0.58  0.58  0.84  0.62  0.01 
Profit 
trade 
Coef.  47.16  -120.65  -21.24  -1.38  -5.76  -0.71  -73.07 
0.00  1.92  0.07  Prob.   0.10  0.25  0.24  0.80  0.33  0.87  0.33 
Table 3.10 (Cont.) OLS Estimates of the  Regression of  SXF Transaction  Costs  with Measures of Trading 
Activity and Spreads 
Notes: OLS estimates of the regression of SXF daily transaction profit/Cost in C$ per contract on measures of 
trading activity and Spreads are presented. In the table, BA is the daily mean Spread1 of Best 1 for Panel A and 
is the daily mean Spread2 for Panel B. The best bid price is defined as the highest price a prospective buyer is 
prepared to pay at a particular time for trading the futures contract. In the analyses, the variable Best 1 Bid is 
defined as the best bid depth, which corresponds to the sum of all bid sizes (number of contracts) that are 
submitted as limit orders for trading at the best bid price for market participant bid quotations that are equal to 
the best bid price. Best 2 Bid is the second best bid depth, and so forth. The best ask (or offer) price is the lowest 
price at which someone who owns the contract offers to sell it. We define Best1 Ask as the best ask depth, which 
is the sum of all ask sizes (number of contracts) that are submitted as limit orders to trade at the best ask price for 
market participant ask quotations that are equal to the best ask price. Best 2 Ask is the second best ask depth. 
Spread1 =Ask Price – Bid Price; and Spread2= (Ask Price-Bid Price)*2/ (Ask Price + Bid Price)*100. 
TV is Mean Trade Volume. D is a dummy variable, which equals 1 when TV +3 * Std TV> Q + 3 *Std Q; and Q 
is the daily mean quantity of Best 1 Ask for Panel A and Best 1 Bid for Panel B. Std stands for standard 
deviation. P is transaction price. DW is Durbin-Watson stat. PF is the p value of the regression. RSQ is R square 
of the regression, Profit trade is daily FIFO profit for each account type of Firm, Client, Pro, Hedger, Speculator 
(Spec) and Market Maker. Average profit is the weight average profits of the FIFO profit and the profits of daily 
inventory imbalance settled at the closing price. The number of contracts traded or settled is used as the weight. 
C is constant term in the OLS model. 356 daily data from January 04, 2005 to May 31, 2006.are used in the 
regression. Value in Bold indicates significant at 5 percent level.  
 
Harris and Hasbrouck (1996) document that 54 percent of SuperDot orders are limit orders. 
Ross et al. (1996) report that limit orders account for 65 percent (75 percent) of all executed 
orders (executed shares) in  SuperDot.  Compared with  these results,  limit orders are used 
much more extensively in SXF trades. As shown in the table, Limit order accounts for 97.70 
percent of all trades on the nearby SXF contract (Limit to All) when measured by the number 
of  trades;  the  account  for  94.11  percent  of  all  trades  on  the  nearby  SXF  contract  when International Econometric Review (IER) 
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measured by the number of contracts traded. Only very small proportion of the SXF trades 
were conducted through Market on Opening (Mo) or Market order (Mkt).  
 
  By Number of Trade  By Trade Volume 
  Limit To All  Mkt To All  Mo To All  Limit To All  Mkt To All  Mo To All 
Average Daily  97.70%  1.67%  0.63%  94.11%  1.19%  4.08% 
Whole Sample   97.45%  1.96%  0.58%  92.97%  1.13%  4.91% 
Table 3.11 Summary of the SXF Transaction by Order Type 
Notes:  The  summary  of  the  SXF  transaction  by  order  types  is  presented.  Average  Daily  is  the  results  by 
calculating the percentages on each day and then calculating the average for the sample period; Whole Sample is 
the results by calculating the sum of the  number of trade/the trade  volume on the sample period and then 
calculating the percentage for the sample period. All is all records without classifying a trade by order types. 
Limit, Mkt and Mo are Limit, Market and Market on Opening in a trade data file that recodes each trade with 
Limit, Market or Market on Opening in the Order Type from March 01 2005 to April 28 2006. 
 
In such a market where limit orders are used by most transactions, the role of limit order book 
must  be  more  important.  When  the  best  1  quote  book  in  the  market  provides  enough 
liquidity/buffer to absorb potential trading orders, transaction costs should not be expected to 
be related to with measures of trading activities. On the other hand, to ameliorate price impact 
and informational leakage effects, investors looking to open or close large positions may need 
to structure their orders according to the depth of the best 1 limit order, to ameliorate price 




Using a unique database that includes the quotes and trade characteristics of the SXF market 
from January 2005 to May 2006 on the index futures of the SXF with aggregated trader types 
identified  and  time  stamped  in  millisecond  from  the  Montreal  Exchange,  We  find  that 
transactions costs, as correctly measured are not related to measures of trading activity, in 
both pair-wise correlation analyses as well as in a regression framework when limit orders 
provide enough liquidity for markets, especially for electronic systems.  
 
The limit order book conveys information about the market. Statistics of transaction by order 
type show that almost all trades are executed by limit orders for SXF market.  
 
We  find  a  significant  role  for  limit  orders,  especially  that  of  depth  1  in  determining 
participants’  trading  behaviour,  and  in  providing  liquidity  to  the  market.  In  addition,  the 
results highlight the inability of traditional spreads to measure trading costs. 
 
All our level or volatility measures of quotes and trades by every aggregated account show 
evidence of mean reversion. This is consistent with a dynamic equilibrium process for the 
SXF  market,  wherein  shocks  to  the  variables  do  not  have  permanent  dislocating  effects. 
Moreover, the fact that the costs or spreads are much higher than the minimum tick size also 
implies  participants  in  the  SXF  market  respect  the  limit  order  to  make  their  investment 
decision.  
 
Although participants in a limit order market can employ different order placement strategies, 
the aggregated actions of the participants still can leads the market to dynamic equilibrium 
when a majority of the participants have, on aggregated basis, established trading proclivities. 
In such an equilibrium system, the aggregated trading costs will not follow the fluctuations of 
various traditional market activity measures. Studying the overall equilibrium of electronic Switzer and Fan-Limit Orders, Trading Activity, and Transactions Costs in Equity Futures in … 
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systems  for other derivative markets  and the role of limit  order book in  determining the 
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